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Reciprocal Trusts-A Tax Avoidance
Device With Recuperative Powers
Philip G. Johnson
Why are ye fearful, 0 ye of little faith? Matthew VIII:26
The Technical Changes Act of 19491 supposedly conferred the
last rites of a sympathetic and forgiving administration upon a tax
avoidance device which had apparently been dealt a mortal blow by
judicial opinion. 2 Developments since 1949 seem to indicate that
the requiem was sung too early and the corpse will not lie down
and play dead.3
The device, the use of reciprocal or converse trusts, had its
greatest period of development in the years prior to 1940. In that
year a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Lehman v. Commissioner,4 and subsequent decisions of
other courts and the Board of Tax Appeals indicated that the tax
avoidance possibilities of the device were illusory.5 As the decision
in the Lehman case caught many taxpayers unawares, the Technical
Changes Act of 1949 included relief provisions for persons in this
situation. Under the act, persons who had created reciprocal trusts
prior to January 1, 1940, were permitted to release certain powers
retained in such trusts free of gift tax and without having the re-
linquishment considered as in contemplation of death. The relin-
quishment of the powers had to be before January 1, 1951, and
applied only if a gift tax had been paid by the person who made the
* B.S. 1932, Iowa State College; LL.B. 1957, University of Nebraska;
C.P.A.; Member, Council of American Institute of Accountants; presently
Senior partner, Philip G. Johnson & Co., Lincoln, Nebraska.
'Act of Oct. 25, 1949, c. 720, § 6, 63 Stat. 893.
2 "The use of reciprocal trusts as an informed mode of tax avoidance has
thus been dead for some eight full years. But ... it may be said of those
same converse trusts ... that they still rule from their new fully taxable
graves." Colgan and Molloy, Converse Trusts-The Rise and Fall of a Tax
Avoidance Device, 3 Tax L. Rev 271, 273 (1948).
3 Tobin v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950); Newberry's Estate
v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953), reversing 17 T.C. 597 (1951);
McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956).
4109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
5For a detailed and documented analysis of the development of the
Lehman doctrine prior to 1949 see Colgan and Molloy, supra note 2, and
Callan, The Lehman Doctrine-Its Significance and Application, 26 Taxes
233 (1948)
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reciprocal transfers.6 Some of the decisions of the courts since the
Technical Changes Act of 1949 indicate that the legislature would
have been better advised to have considered methods of eliminating
a loophole, rather than providing relief for taxpayers who had ap-
parently made a mistake in judgment in adopting methods of min-
imizing estate taxes. 7
The device of reciprocal trusts is relatively simple. A and B
are husband and wife. A would like to create a trust for his chil-
dren, but is reluctant to give up complete control over the funds he
wishes to give them. He would like to retain the right to change his
mind and to alter, amend, or revoke; perhaps he would like to retain
the income for his life. The retention of any of these rights, how-
ever, would result in making the transfer ineffective as a means
of reducing taxes. If he gives the income to his spouse, or gives her
the right to alter, amend, or revoke, the estate tax saving can be
accomplished. But this gives the power over the funds to his wife,
B. Assuming the wife has property of her own, she can create a
similar trust and gives the income and the powers to alter, amend,
and revoke her trust to A. Considering the trust created by B alone,
B has not retained any of the rights that will cause it to be taxed
in her estate, and looking at A's trust, A has not retained any such
rights in his trust. If the trusts are of the same size, each settlor
will have the same income and the same rights of control over funds
as each might have retained in his own trust, but will have income
from and rights in the converse or reciprocal trust only.
I. THE LEHMAN DOCTRINE PRIOR TO THE
TECHNICAL CHANGES ACT OF 1949
The decision of the Second Circuit in 1940 in Lehman v. Com-
missioner," has become the leading case on reciprocal trusts and has
provided the name for the doctrine. In that case, two brothers, Har-
old and Allan Lehman, owned equal shares in certain stocks and
bonds. Harold transferred his interest in the securities to two trusts
under which Allan was entitled to the income for life with remain-
ders to his issue, and Allan was given the power to withdraw up to
6 The relief did not apply to the release of a life estate. Sen. Rep. No.
831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
7 If the reasoning in the Newberry case is followed, legislation may be
needed to prevent a deficiency in the present scope of the estate law from
developing." Warren and Surrey, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 343
(1956) commenting on Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874
(3d Cir. 1953). In McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956), the
court indicated it followed Newberry, supra.
8 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
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$75,000 in principal from each trust. Allan created two similar trusts
of his interest in the stocks and bonds, under which Harold was
entitled to the income from the trusts for life with remainders to
Harold's issue, and Harold was given the power to withdraw up to
$75,000 from each trust. It was admitted that Allan had created
his trusts in consideration of Harold creating his.
The court held that, in substance, the situation was the same
as if Harold had reserved the right to withdraw $150,000 from his
own trust, stating:
.... The fact that the trusts were reciprocated or "crossed" is a
trifle, quite lacking in practical or legal significance .... The de-
cisive point is that the decedent by transfer of his share to the
brother or for the brother's use or according to the brother's di-
rection caused the brother to make a transfer of property in trust
under which the decedent had the right to withdraw $150,000 from
principal.9
Harold was therefore the settlor of the trusts in which he had the
power to invade the corpus to the extent of $150,000, and was.
taxable to that extent upon the theory that he had retained the
power to revoke this part of the trusts.10 The court relied upon a
quotation from Scott, The Law of Trusts which reads as follows:
"A person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a
trust is the settlor, even though in form the trust is created by an-
other person." 11
It is interesting to note that twice before this doctrine had been
urged upon a judicial body in a tax case. Each time, once by a tax-
payer,12 and once by the Commissioner,'13 the argument had been
made that trusts with reciprocal provisions had been created in con-
sideration of each other. The Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in 1928, and the Board of Tax Appeals in 1933, each rejected the
contention.
Once the doctrine had been expounded, many opportunities
were found to apply it. Although the foundation of the doctrine
9 Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1940).
10 "The fact that the transfers took place prior to the Revenue Act of
1932, wherein section 302(c) was amended 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 411(c) pre-
vented imposition of estate tax on entire property put in trust by the
brother for the decedent's life use." Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99,
101 (2d Cir. 1940).
1 1 Scott, Trusts § 156.3 (1939). The citation has now gone the full
circle. The 1956 edition cites Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1940), 2 Scott, Trusts § 156.3 n.3 (2d ed. 1956).
12 Phillips v. Gnichtel, 27 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S.
636 (1928).
13 Margaret A. Holmes, 27 B.T.A. 660 (1933).
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was attacked on the theory that the reference from Scott, The Law
of Trusts, was applicable only to spendthrift trusts, 14 and the doc-
trine was called a "desecration of the principles of trusts and con-
tracts," 15 by 1948 it could be said that ".... the converse trust doc-
trine thus enunciated has won wide if not universal acceptance." 16
The principal difficulty in applying the doctrine has been the
determination of whether or not the transfers in trust were made
in consideration of each other. The presence or absence of consider-
ation has been based on the subjective intent of the parties. 7 As in
Lehman, some taxpayers have been obliging enough to stipulate
the fact of consideration. 8 But in other cases it has been necessary
for the courts to determine its presence or absence from evidence
or by inference from objective facts. The Tax Court,10 and the
Courts of Appeal for the Second" and Eighth2 Circuits, have con-
sidered simultaneous creation and reciprocal provisions as prima
facie proof of consideration. The inference from reciprocal pro-
visions was determined to outweigh vague evidence that the trusts
were not intended to be converse.22 Evidence that the wife did not
know the size of her husband's trust was immaterial.2 Simultaneous
creation of the trusts was not considered necessary. A two-day
interval was not material,24 and six-day25 and thirteen-day 26 inter-
vals did not prevent the application of the doctrine. The extreme
14 Marx, The Switching of Settlors in Inter-vivos Trusts, 26 Taxes 622,
629 (1948).
15 Marx, supra note 14, at 623.
16 Colgan and Molloy, supra note 2, at 276.
17 Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 211 (1956).
18 Estate of Thomas Neal, 2 T.C.M. 1137 (1943); Estate of Olive H. Oliver,
3 T.C.M. 408 (1944), aff'd per curiam, 148 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1945); Estate
of Frederick S. Fish, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1940). See also Estate of Carolyn
Peck Boardman, 20 T.C. 871 (1953) (taxpayer stipulated consideration).
19 Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945); Estate of Henry S.
Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943); Estate of Clothilde K. Lueders, 6 T.C. 587 (1946),
rev'd, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947) even though not simultaneous creation.
2OHanauer's Estate v. Commissiiner, 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945).
21 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
22 Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945); Estate of John Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945).
2 3 Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945).
24 Purdon Smith Whitely, 42 B.T.A. 316 (1940).
25 Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945).
26 Werner A. Wieboldt, 5 T.C. 946 (1945).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
situation occurred in In re Leuders' Estate,2 7 where the Tax Court
found that a transfer in trust by the decedent was consideration for
a trust created by her husband fifteen months previously.
The fact that the trusts were not of the same size did not pre-
vent a finding of reciprocity.28 In that event the courts have held
the trusts to be reciprocal only to the extent of the smaller trust.
In Cole's Estate v. Commissioner," the trust created by the husband
consisted of 600 shares of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance stock,
later increased to 700 shares. The trust created by the wife con-
sisted of 300 shares of the same stock. At the death of the husband
the wife's trust was taxed to him, and at the death of the wife the
husband's trust was held taxable in her estate to the extent of the
300 shares of stock.
Taxpayers have been singularly unable to succeed in either
proving that the trusts were not in consideration of each other or
that they were.30 Prior to 1947, the taxpayer had only once suc-
cessfully borne the burden of proving an intent that would yield
a favorable tax result.3 1 The successful attempt was in Estate of
Samuel Lindsay.32 In that case the husband created a trust under
which he gave his wife a life estate and at approximately the same
time the wife transferred a similar amount of property to a trust
under which her husband took a life interest. The wife knew of
the husband's trust, but the husband did not know of the wife's.
The Tax Court held that since the husband did not know of the
wife's trust, there could be no intention to create trusts in consider-
ation of each other 33 and the reciprocal doctrine does not apply.
The court said:
... But the fact that the trusts were executed about the same
time, were in substantially equal amounts, and had similar pro-
275 T.C. 587 (1946), rev'd, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
28 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944); Estate of
Frederick S. Fish, 45 B.T.A. 120 (1940).
29 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
30 1Marrs McLean, 41 B.T.A. 1266 (191), affd on this point, 127 F.2d 942
(5th Cir. 1942).
31 Colgan and Molloy, supra note 2, at 282.
322 T.C. 174 (1943).
33 A text writer points out that if there was any consideration involved
in this case, the husband's trust was consideration for the creation of the
wife's trust, of which he had no knowledge. Taxing her trust in his estate
would be "predicated upon the absurd assumption that a man may furnish
the consideration for a transfer of which he is entirely unaware." Lowndes
and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 17, at 213.
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visions are not conclusive that the trusts were interdependent and
were executed in consideration of each other.34
The Lehman doctrine was carried to its greatest extreme in
Estate of Clothilde K. Lueders.35 In that case the busband trans-
ferred all of his property, worth some $640,000, to an irrevocable
trust on July 2, 1930. His wife, the decedent, was given a life estate
and the power to alter, amend, or revoke, or to vest corpus in her-
self. Fifteen months later, at a time when the husband's trust was
worth $373,000, the decedent created a trust worth $349,200 for her
husband. When she created this trust, her husband was in financial
difficulties and within a month called for and received the entire
corpus of the decedent's trust. Despite the fifteen-month lapse of
time, the Tax Court held the transfers reciprocal, saying:
These facts compel the conclusion that the decedent furnished
consideration for the trust which was in existence at the date of her
death.... This conclusion is impelled by the effects of the transac-
tions of the decedent and her husband relating to their respective
assets. The two trusts which were created were reciprocal upon the
creation in 1931 of the second trust. This is because, under a prac-
tical view of the facts, the creation of a trust by the decedent in 1931
made it feasible for the 1930 trust to be continued in existence.
Furthermore, the circumstances strongly indicate that Frederick
Lueders had some assurance in 1930, when he transferred all of his
assets to a trust, that the decedent would not fail to provide him
with some assets, in return, if necessary. She did this a little over
one year thereafter.3 6
The Third Circuit, however, reversed and placed the burden of
proving the trusts reciprocal upon the government where "under
the stipulation of facts, the trust created by the decedent's husband
was on its face a prima facie gift." 37 The circuit court also found
that the Tax Court had "made no specific finding either in its finding
of facts or in its opinion, that the decedent and her husband had
ever entered into an agreement, express or implied, to make re-
ciprocal transfers of property." 3
II. THE LEHMAN DOCTRINE SUBSEQUENT TO THE
TECHNICAL CHANGES ACT OF 1949
At this stage of the development of the doctrine, the Technical
Changes Act of 1949 was passed in order to afford relief to the un-
fortunate individuals who had availed themselves of the promising
34 Estate of Samuel S. Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174, 178 (1943).
35 6 T.C. 587 (1946).
36Id. at 592.
37 In re Lueders' Estate, 164 F.2d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1947).
38 Id. at 132.
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device of reciprocal trusts and had been frustrated by the Lehman
doctrine.3 9
The first decision handed down by a court of appeals after the
adoption of the Act was the decision of the Second Circuit in Orvis
v. Higgins,40 overruling a district court decision.41 In that case the
husband's trust was created six days after that of the wife. The
provisions of the trusts were reciprocal, with life estates granted
to each spouse and remainders to the children. Sufficient evidence
was introduced at the hearing in the district court to convince the
trial judge that Mr. and Mrs. Orvis "each pursued an independent
course" in creating the trusts, and that no reciprocity was intended.
In reversing, the circuit court speaking through Judge Frank said:
... [T]he undisputed facts are such that we have a "definite and
firm conviction" that the trial judge was mistaken . . .We there-
fore hold that finding "clearly erroneous" and hold, rather, that each
of those trusts was made in consideration of the other....
... [Tihere is nothing in the testimony which in any manner
offsets what we believe to be the virtually irresistible inference
drawn from the undisputed facts. To offset that inference the trial
judge relied on no positive testimony that Mr. and Mrs. Orvis acted
independently but relied on negative testimony as to the absence of
an expressed intention to act reciprocally...42
It is interesting to compare this case, overruling a district court
decision, with In re Lueders' Estate, overruling a Tax Court decision.
In the Lueders' case, the court reasoned that it was not overruling
a finding of fact, but said that the Tax Court had erred in its in-
terpretation of the legal import of "consideration. '43 In Orvis v.
Higgins, the court reasoned that it could reverse a finding of fact
in a situation where ". . . the finding is that of a trial judge, and
the evidence consists in large part of facts neither side disputes,
in circumstances such that the trial judge's evaluation of credibility
becomes unimportant." 44 Judge Frank placed the burden of proof
on the issue of reciprocity squarely upon the plaintiff, in contrast
to the attitude of the Third Circuit in In re Lueders' Estate, where
the trusts were considered as on their face prima facie gifts.
45
Shortly after the Orvis case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
30 Sen. Rep. No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
40 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).
4180 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
42 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1950).
43 In re Lueders' Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
44 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1950).
45 164 F.2d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1947).
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Circuit, in Tobin v. Commissioner,46 without citing the Lueders'
case also deemed that the language of the trusts created a presump-
tion for the Commissioner to overcome, saying:
We do not consider the doctrine of "reciprocal trusts," as enun-
ciated in Lehman v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 109 F.2d 99, applicable
or controlling in favor of the Commissioner here. in so holding, and
in resorting to the strained fiction of reciprocal or cross trusts
in order to tax the trust income to these taxpayers, we believe
the Tax Court has disregarded the plain language of the trust agree-
ments.47
In Estate of Myrtle H. Newberry,48 the Tax Court continued to
apply "the strained fiction of reciprocal or crossed trusts." In that
case the Newberrys were deeply concerned for the welfare of their
young children, a son and a daughter, neither of whom had inde-
pendent means. John J. Newberry wished to set up trusts for the
two children. The children were quite young and he wanted to
retain control over the trust property in case they made unfortunate
marriages. The idea of creating the trusts was first suggested to
John J. Newberry by his brother. After discussing the matter
with him, Newberry called in his attorney and discussed the plan
with him. Shortly after discussing the plan with his attorney and
after he had the idea "pretty well" fixed in his mind he discussed
it with his wife. Mrs. Newberry thought the idea a good one, and
wanted to do the same thing.
In 1934 John J. Newberry created an irrevocable trust of 2,500
shares of J. J. Newberry Company common stock for his daughter
and a like trust for his son. In 1935 he repeated the process. In
each trust he named himself and his wife as trustees and gave Mrs.
Newberry alone broad power to alter, amend, or terminate the
trusts, but in no event to revest principal or income in him. On each
occasion when Mr. Newberry executed one of these trusts, Mrs.
Newberry executed a similar trust. In each case she named herself
and her husband as trustees and gave him the same powers of alter-
ation as she was granted in the trusts created by him. As the
trusts were originally set up, the Newberrys had contingent life
interests in each other's trusts. From time to time Mr. and Mrs.
Newberry amended the trusts, always making identical amend-
ments. In the course of these amendments their contingent life
estates were eliminated and the power to alter, amend, or revoke
was limited to a power to shift interests among the Newberry issue,
spouses of such issue, and charities.
46 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950).
47 Id. at 921.
4817 T.C. 597 (1951), rev'd, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
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Mr. Newberry testified, and his testimony was not rebutted,
that he would have created his trusts regardless of whether Mrs.
Newberry had created hers. He also testified that the property
placed in trust represented only a small fraction of the wealth of
either spouse, and that neither of them contemplated any personal
benefit or gain from the corpus or income of any of the trusts. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, however, and determined that
Mr. Newberry's trusts were taxable in Mrs. Newberry's estate.
The court said:
The essential consideration here is that, if the power to change
beneficiaries had been reserved in decedent's own trust, there could
be no doubt that the case would fall under section 811(d) (2) and,
therefore, the trust corpus falls within gross estate; and the result
is the same if there are crossed trusts, exchanging the same power,
so that there is in substance transfer by the decedent. Lehman v.
Commissioner, supra. As we said, in an income tax case involving
reciprocal trusts: 'What petitioner lost by the transfer to the trust
created by her for Smith's benefit she recovered as beneficiary of
Smith's trusts." Purdon Smith Whiteley, 42 BTA 316 (321).49
The court of appeals reversed the Tax Court on the grounds
that the consideration for Mr. Newberry's trusts was not the trusts
set up by his wife, since Mr. Newberry would have set up his trusts
irrespective of Mrs. Newberry and since the purpose of the trusts
was not to confer cross benefits upon each other, but to confer a
benefit upon the children. The court said:
... The essential picture which the crossed trusts must reveal
to justify the result reached by the Tax Court in the present case
is a declared grantor induced to establish a trust giving the party
now to be treated for tax purposes as the grantor, a power which
the latter has wanted and has paid for by setting up another trust
to accomplish something desired by the declared grantor. Such
in our views are the rather strict confines of the Lehman doc-
trine.50
The court found that "spouses in mutual confidence and com-
mon interest work out together what each is going to do with his
own money to provide for their children," 51 and if similarity of ac-
tion occurs because "each spouse is confident that they together
have arrived at a wise and benevolent decision concerning the wel-
fare of their children" 52 this is not the "unity" and "interdepend-
ence" of action which would invoke the Lehman doctrine. The
court granted that "there may be policy considerations favorable
to legislation which for particular tax purposes would treat crossed
49 Estate of Myrtle H. Newberry, 17 T.C. 597, 606 (1951).
50 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1953).
51 Id. at 877.
52 Id. at 877.
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trusts of spouses like a single joint transaction with both spouses
pro tanto transferors of the property over which each will there-
after have certain control." But in absence of such legislation, "when
on the facts the conclusion is inescapable that each spouse by a
distinct and bona fide transaction has dispensed with his own
personal estate in accordance with his own personal desires, and
without receiving a quid pro quo from the other," the court did
not think that it could "justifiably refuse to recognize each spouse
as the real transferor of the trust he has formally created." 53
In Estate of Samuel Lindsay,54 in 1943, the taxpayer was suc-
cessful in convincing the Tax Court that trusts with reciprocal
provisions were not created in consideration of each other. It was
almost ten years later, in Estate of Louise D. Ruxton v. Commis-
sioner,5r before the taxpayer was again successful in such a con-
tention before the Tax Court. In that case, as in the Lindsay case,
the taxpayer was able to produce sufficient evidence to convince
the court that in spite of reciprocal provisions the converse trust
doctrine was not applicable.
The case involved the Estate of Louise DeWitt Ruxton. Prior
to 1934 her husband, Philip Ruxton, was a member of the board
of directors of the Harriman National Bank of New York City.
Early in 1934 he was apprehensive at the possibilities of suits being
filed against the directors of the bank for alleged mismanagement.
He consulted his attorney as to the advisability of creating a trust
for the benefit of each of his two daughters in order to provide for
their security and to protect them in the event he should be wiped
out financially as a result of the anticipated litigation. The de-
cedent, who was independently wealthy and was also worried about
the bank situation, had a separate consultation with the same at-
torney relative to her husband's possible financial difficulties. She
told the attorney that she wanted to create a trust to protect her
husband in the event he should lose his fortune as a result of the
litigation. Both the decedent and her husband were aware of the
other's plans with reference to the trusts.
On August 19, 1935, the decedent created a trust with the income
payable for life to her husband. In addition, the capital gains from
sales of securities held in the trust were to be paid to him upon
his written request. Upon the death of Philip Ruxton the re-
mainder was to go to the children in trust or to their issue. The
53 Id. at 878.
542 T.C. 174 (1943).
5520 T.C. 487 (1953).
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trust instrument contained a spendthrift clause applicable to prin-
cipal and income. The securities transferred to this trust aggregated
$250,149.97 and came from the separate estate of Mrs. Ruxton. After
the transfer she retained properties valued far in excess of the
value of the properties transferred in trust. On the same date, Aug-
ust 19, 1935, Philip Ruxton executed two separate trust agree-
ments. The trusts were identical except for the interchange of the
names of the grantor's two daughters. Each trust instrument gave
the net income to the daughter for life with remainders over to
his wife should the daughter predecease her. If the wife was not
living at the death of one daughter the remainder went to the other
daughter. The trusts included a spendthrift clause. Philip Ruxton
died on January 8, 1945. His federal estate tax return showed a
gross estate in excess of one million dollars not including the
value of the corpus of either of the trusts created by him on August
19, 1935. Louise DeWitt Ruxton died on June 16, 1948, and the Com-
missioner determined that the portion of the property owned by
the husband and transferred to the two trusts was taxable in her
estate.5 1
The petitioner contended that the reciprocal trust doctrine was
not applicable for the reason that there was no concert of actioR,
no consideration between the decedent and her husband, and no
reciprocity or equivalence of rights. Petitioner also argued that
there was no close relationship between the value of the transfers,
in that the primary life income estate granted to her husband had
an actuarial value of $66,369 whereas both of the two trusts created
by decedent's husband had a total actuarial value to the decedent,
if she survived the daughters, of only $11,581 on the date the trusts
were created, and $6,442.85 on the date of her death. In holding for
the petitioner, the Tax Court said:
In the instant case we have before us the trust instruments,
evidence of the circumstances which motivated the execution
thereof, and the testimony of the lawyer who advised both the
decedent and her husband. We think the motives of the parties
certainly have a bearing on their intentions with respect to unity
of purpose, interdependence, and consideration, or the lack thereof.
On this record we strongly infer and therefore conclude that the
5 The Commissioner valued the decedent's interest in the two trusts
created by her husband as being the total value of the corpora of the two
trusts amounting to $532,403.83 less the amount of $252,892.23 which rep-
resented the total value of the two primary life estates. This left a balance
of $279,511.60, but he limited the amount includible to $270,315.16 which
was the value of the property actually transferred by decedent to the
trust created by her on August 19, 1935.
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decedent acted independently in dictating the substantive terms
she desired to impose on her transfer in trust for the primary and
immediate benefit of her husband during his life time and there-
after for her daughters and grandchildren; that the decedent de-
termined to make the character of the transfer she made without
regard to any action on the part of her husband; . . . The only
concept of action by them was in the final stages when decedent
advised the attorney that she wanted the details of her trust dis-
cussed with her husband and the fact that the instruments were
executed on the same date. Such limited concert of action does not
place the decedent and her husband in proper juxtaposition to have
reciprocated on the trust.57
The court indicated, in reaching its conclusion, that the trusts
were not executed in consideration of each other. They were
influenced by the apparent lack of a quid pro quo as evidenced by
the trust instruments, the Court saying:
*.. In the Lehman, Cole's Estate, Hanauer's Estate, and Orvis
cases, supra, the uncrossing of the trusts and the transposition of
the respective grantors left each with substantially the same degree
of beneficial right in or power of control over the respective prop-
erties transferred, limited in value for tax purposes by the value
of the lesser corpus transferred. In the instant case the uncrossing
of the trusts and the transposition of the decedent and her husband
as the grantor of the other's trusts would place each of them in a
position entirely untenable with the givng of a quid pro quo to
induce the action of the other and also untenable with the mate-
rially different expressed desire or purpose of each as evidenced by
the respective trusts.58
In 1956 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, taking
its first look at the Lehman doctrine in McLain v. Jarecki,69 with
one judge dissenting, decided to line up with the Third Circuit in
its antagonism to the Lehman doctrine, and refused to infer con-
sideration from the reciprocal nature of the trusts.60 The decision
of the circuit court affirmed the decision of a district court.61 All
of the evidence in the district court was stipulated. The two trusts
in question were both created on the same date, December 27,
1934, and both were amended on December 18, 1935. As amended,
the trust created by the husband, referred to as the Dorothy trust,
provided that the net income of the trust was to be accumulated
57Estate of Louise D. Ruxton, 20 T.C. 487, 494 (1953).
58 Id. at 495.
59232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956).
60 The court refused to follow Orvis v. Higgins, but chose to follow the
3d Circuit decision in Newberry. The majority opinion does not comment
on the presence of evidence negativing reciprocity in Newberry and the
absence of such evidence in Orvis v. Higgins.
61 McLain v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
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and added to the principal of the trust until the death of the
grantor, Albert 0. McLain. After his death the income was to be
paid to his wife during her life time, and after the death of the
grantor and his wife, the income was to be paid to Dorothy Cole,
their daughter or to her issue. The Dorothy trust could be revoked
during the life time of the grantor, while either Mrs. McLain or
their two children were living, by an instrument in writing signed
by Mrs. McLain and their two children, or such of them as were
living and by all persons affected thereby. The amendment in 1935
permitted Harold 0. McLain, a son, and Mrs. McLain to terminate
the trust during the life time of Dorothy or any of her issue. If it
was terminated, the trust estate was to be distributed to Dorothy
Cole, if living, or, if not then living, to her issue. The other trust cre-
ated by Minnie A. McLain, the wife, contained similar conditions
providing for the accumulation of the income during her life time,
thereafter payment of the income to her husband, and finally
termination and distribution to their son, Harold 0. McLain or
to his issue. It contained similar revocation and termination pro-
visions as in the Dorothy trust.
The court analyzed the Lehman case as follows:
The short of Lehman is that a person becomes a settlor of a
trust if he supplies the consideration, in spite of another person's
mechanical declaration of the trust, hence the Lehman court
searched for consideration moving from the decedent to his brother,
and having found it affirmed the Board's decision holding the
trusts includable in decedent's estate.62
The court found that among the stipulated facts there were:
... [NJone expressly showing that Albert 0. McLain, dece-
dent here, brought about the transfer from his wife, Minnie A.
McLain. Because the McLains had substantially identical trusts
created concurrently and prepared by their mutual lawyers, the
government would have us infer an element of consideration from
which to hold that decedent was the actual grantor of the trust in
which his wife declared herself to be the grantor.... To reach the
inference, indispensable for the government's position, would mean
compounding probabilities on the subjective impression we have
of the objective stipulated facts .... These trusts, and the stipulated
facts can also be read as articulating a donative state of mind once
extant between the McLains, Newberry Estate v. Commissioner,
201 F.2d 874 (3rd Cir. 1953); Estate of L. D. Ruxton v. Commissioner
20 T. C. 847 (1953) .... 63
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Judge Schnackenberg dis-
tinguished the Newberry case on the grounds that in that case
62 McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir. 1956).
03 Id. at 213.
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neither settlor created any beneficial interest therein for his or
her spouse, whereas in the McLain trust there was a beneficial
interest "contemporaneously bestowed upon the maker by the
maker of the other trust." Judge Schnackenberg said:
... It is an undue taxing of our credulity to ask us to believe
that this transaction lacked consideration. The only logical in-
ference to be drawn from the stipulated facts is that when Albert
gave to Minnie a life estate in the trust he then created, and she
contemporaneously did the same for him, the act of one was the
consideration for the act of the other .... Both reason and the
law place upon him who would rebut this reasonable inference the
burden of introducing evidence to that end. The competent attor-
neys who devised the plan now reviewed before us and their as-
sistants or office associates were certainly in a position to intro-
duce evidence on this subject, the nature of which is exemplified
in the Newberry case. However, it is well to point out that even
such testimony, to be effective, must counterbalance the fact of
the execution of the trusts agreements and their contents. In the
case at bar, such evidence would have to explain why each of the
trusts set up a life estate in the spouse of the maker of the trust.64
IIL CONCLUSION
All of the courts are apparently in agreement on the basic
proposition of the Lehman doctrine. They agree that if the creation
of one trust is paid for and brought about by the creation of the
other, the doctrine applies. As said in McLain v. Jarecki, "consid-
eration is essential to a finding of reciprocity."65
The disagreement between the tribunals is over whether or
not consideration exists. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit " and the Tax Court 67 will infer consideration from the
terms of the trusts and the circumstances surrounding their crea-
tion, unless evidence to the contrary is convincing.", The Eighth
Circuit,6 9 at least in the absence of evidence, will infer considera-
64 Id. at 214.
65 McLain v Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
66 Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950); Hanauer's Estate v.
Commissioner, 149 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945).
67 Among others, Estate of John H. Eckardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945); Estate of
Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943); Estate of Myrtle H. Newberry, 17
T.C. 597 (1951), rev'd, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953); Estate of Clothilde K.
Lueders, 6 T.C. 587 (1946), rev'd, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
68 Estate of Louise D. Ruxton, 20 T.C. 487 (1953); Estate of Samuel S.
Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174 (1943).
69 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
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tion from the objective facts. The Third Circuit 70 will not infer
consideration if any evidence is introduced to the contrary. The
FifthM ' and Seventh Circuits, 7 2 more or less emphatically, have re-
fused to make any such inference, in the absence of evidence of
consideration. The square conflict between the circuits on this
point has resulted from making the concept of consideration de-
pendent upon the subjective intent of the transferors and the
difficulty of determining subjective intent from objective facts.
The opinions of the Second Circuit and of the Tax Court indicate
that they find it highly improbable that settlors would create
trusts with provisions for each other's benefit unless induced to do
so by a quid pro quo provided by the spouse's transfer.73
This cynical attitude overlooks the fact that many irrevocable
trusts were created by husbands giving their spouses life estates
and powers to alter, amend, and revoke, when the wife had no
property to give her husband in return. Such trusts were created
for the purpose of making a gift to avoid estate taxes and were an
accepted method of doing so. Undoubtedly such trusts were also
created by wives whose husbands were not financially able to
reciprocate, and such trusts are not questionable. It is not too
difficult to conceive of a situation where both husband and wife
have a desire to conserve their respective estate for their children,
and each were willing to create trusts even though the other did not.
It is entirely plausible that the court in Lehman was not really
thinking of the common law meaning of "consideration" when it
reached its conclusion, but was influenced by the same underlying
principles as produced the Clifford74 doctrine a month later.7 5
The presence of consideration, which was conveniently stipulated
70 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953); In
re Lueder's Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
71 Tobin v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950).
72 McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956).
73 In Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1950), the court stated
that any inference that the trusts were not reciprocal "must rest on a
belief in the purely chance concurrence of several events, although the
coincidental occurrence of those events would ordinarily be highly im-
probable. Such a belief ought not to be the foundation of a trial judge's
finding on a fact issue, in favor of the side having (like the plaintiff's
here) the burden of proof as to that issue, unless the purely chance char-
acter of those events is positively confirmed by clear evidence."
74 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
7GThe Lehman decision was handed down on January 22, 1940, the
Clifford decision on February 26, 1940.
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by the taxpayer, perhaps only provided a convenient device-that
the court could use to rationalize its opinion.
In the Clifford case a husband was taxed upon the income
from a short term trust which he had created for his wife, upon the
theory that he remained substantial owner of the trust property
because there was merely a "temporary reallocation of income
within an intimate family group" which did "not effect any sub-
stantial change in his economic position." The court stated:
... Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or
conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius
may construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the
basic issue. That issue is whether the grantor after the trust has
been established may still be treated, under this statutory scheme,
as the owner of the corpus.... [TIhe answer to that question must
depend on an analysis of the terms of the trust and all the circum-
stances attendant on its creation and operation.TS
A basic feature of reciprocal trusts is, of course, that it is only
the legal position of the transferors that has changed and the eco-
nomic position has not been materially altered. As indicated
by Colgan and Malloy 77 the Board of Tax appeals has invoked
the Lehman and Clifford cases jointly to justify tax on income of
converse trusts and has used the Clifford rule to tax the income
of reciprocal trusts to the grantors where employment of the
Lehman doctrine alone would have resulted in no tax. But in
Estate of Frederick S. Fish7s the Board specifically rejected it
although it did invoke the Lehman doctrine. In Cole's Estate, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reinforced its affirmation
of the decision of the Tax Court as follows:
... Each decedent by the trusts created may be regarded as
having "retained for his life * * * the right to income from" the
300 shares which he himself transferred to the trust created by
him on the theory of family relationship and equivalents. For, as
a result of the terms of the identical and simultaneous trusts and
of the "familial relationship," each decedent "retained the sub-
stance of full enjoyment of all the rights [for lifel which previ-
ously he had in the property." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,
336, 60 S.Ct. 554, 557, 84 L. Ed. 788. To the extent of the income
from 300 shares of the stock there was no change in the economic
position of either grantor.79
The application of Clifford principles would also explain the
results in the Second Circuit,80 and the Tax Court decisions in
76 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
77 Colgan and Molloy, supra note 2, at 292.
78 45 B.T.A. 120 (1941).
79 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636, 638 (8th Cir. 1944).
80 See note 73, supra.
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Newberry8l and Lueders' Estate.82 A reluctance to apply the
principles would explain the decision in the Third Circuit in
Newberry's Estate83 and in In re Lueders' Estate,8 4 in the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Tobins  and in the McLainO case in the Seventh Circuit.
The Ruxton and Lindsay cases8 7 in the Tax Court are not so easily
explainable. The Lindsay case would clearly have a different result
under the Clifford rules, but the Ruxton case, on the clear finding of
absence of tax saving motive and relative lack of equivalence of the
transfers might still be valid under Clifford principles. 88
The application of the Clifford rule expounded by the Supreme
Court has proved difficult to administer and has involved great un-
certainty and a vast amount of litigation. It is no wonder that the
Lehman doctrine, which is based upon similar equitable principles,
but rationalized on a common law definition of consideration by a
court with less authority, is not universally accepted. It is doubtful if
the conflict will be resolved without legislative or Supreme Court
intervention. All nine Supreme Court Justices could not agree on
the Clifford rule.8 9 It is too much to expect all eleven courts of
appeal to agree on an issue involving similar principles 0
81Estate of Myrtle H. Newberry, 17 T.C. 597 (1951), rev'd, 201 F.2d 874
(3d Cir. 1953).
82Estate of Clothide K. Lueders, 6 T.C. 587 (1946), rev'd, 164 F.2d 128
(3d Cir. 1947).
8 3 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
84 In re Lueders' Estate, 164 F.2d 128 .3d Cir. 1947). In this case, O'Con-
nell, C.J. in his dissenting opinion expressed the opinion that the case
should be remanded to the tax court in order to have the body consider
the effect of the Clifford rule.
85 Tobin v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950).
SOMcLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956).
87Estate of Louise D. Ruxton, 20 T. C. 487 (1953); Estate of Samuel S.
Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174 (1943).
88 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a much criticized
opinion, once held the regulations of the Treasury department isued to
interpret the Clifford rule to be unconstitutional. Commissioner v. Clarke,
202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
89 Mr. Justice Roberts, in a dissent in which he was joined by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, expressed the opinion that the majority decision was a judi-
cial amendment of the Revenue Act of 1934 and such legislation should have
been left to Congress.
90 The foundation of the doctrine on the equitable principles of the Clif-
ford rule, rather than on the common law definition of consideration, would
explain the ineffectiveness of taxpayers' attempts to invoke the rule.
